

Entering the State: Civil Society Activism and Participatory Governance in Brazil

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Participatory governance programs, which institutionalize government–civil society interactions through the promotion of public deliberation and decision making, are being adopted by local governments to harness a wide range of outcomes believed to be positively associated with citizens' and civil society organizations' active involvement in public life. This article draws from an original survey administered to 833 individuals elected to leadership positions in Brazil's municipal-level participatory budgeting program. Analysis of these data using a series of outcome variables and a set of individual- and municipal-level variables demonstrates that civil society organization (CSO) leaders now engage in direct negotiations with other CSOs, form alliances with other CSOs and carry these practices into other institutional venues, which helps to undercut traditional clientelistic practices while also empowering citizens and enhancing the quality of democracy. Further, citizens living in communities that directly benefit from public works won through participatory budgeting are empowered by credible state commitment. Citizens not directly affiliated with a CSO continue to rely on their direct connections to government officials, thus demonstrating that individuals' type of involvement in civil society has a significant impact on how participatory governance arrangements can affect basic state–society relationships.

Keywords: democratic institution building; civil society; participatory governance; Brazil

Participatory governance programs, which institutionalize government–civil society interactions in public deliberation and decision-making venues, are being adopted by local governments across the world to harness a wide range of outcomes believed to be positively associated with citizens' and civil society organizations' (CSOs) active involvement in public life. State performance, the quality of democracy, citizen empowerment, public deliberation and citizenship rights are reportedly enhanced by the presence of active citizen involvement in public life (Avritzer 2002; 2009; Dagnino, 1998; Fishkin, 1993; McAdam *et al.*, 1996; Pateman, 1970; Putnam, 1993; Roberts, 1998; Santos, 2005). Although there is a rich body of research that shows how participatory governance generates a broad range of positive outcomes, we continue to lack analysis using individual-level data to demonstrate how citizens' type of activity in civil society affects individuals' ability to take advantage of the public engagement rules embedded in participatory governance. When citizens are able to take advantage of the new rules and practices associated with participatory governance, basic state–society relations can be transformed, thereby reducing clientelism, empowering citizens and enhancing the quality of democracy.

This article identifies four types of civil society actor – CSO leaders, CSO members, former CSO members and unaffiliated but civically engaged citizens – and then analyzes their attitudes and behavior using logistic regression to account better for how individuals' type of civil society activity affects engagement within a state-sanctioned participatory institution. When citizens help to set the agenda of public meetings, when citizens learn to engage in new types of public negotiation, and when citizens then carry these new



behaviors to different institutional settings, we can assert that the direct involvement of citizens in participatory governance institutions has a meaningful impact on state performance, empowerment and the quality of democracy (Abers, 2000; Baiocchi, 2005; Dryzek, 2000; Fishkin, 1993). Conversely, when individuals' type of activity in civil society is not significantly associated with the development of new political practices then this gives credence to claims that there is not a clear connection between civil society activity and democratic outcomes (Armony, 2004; Bernam, 1997; Encarnación, 2003).

The evidence for this article is drawn from participatory budgeting (PB) programs adopted at Brazil's municipal level. The 1980s, 1990s and 2000s were a period of remarkable political and social change in Brazil. The 1980s initiated a time of profound social, political and economic transformation due to the mobilization of civil society and new political parties (Workers' party and Brazilian Democratic Movement party) in opposition to military rule; civilian rule returned in 1985 and direct elections for the presidency were held in 1989. A new constitution was promulgated in 1988, permitting the direct participation of citizens in government-sponsored processes and requiring that municipal, state and federal governments guarantee a broad set of social rights (e.g. health care, housing and education). Across Brazil during the 1980s, local governments experimented with new formats to include the voice of citizens in public fora.

During the 1990s, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government established a stable monetary system, privatized important sectors of the economy and helped usher in a period of extensive municipalization of federal authority, as mandated by the 1988 Constitution (Font, 2003; Kingstone and Power, 2000). In the 2000s, President Lula da Silva's government oversaw a period of strong economic growth and his government established a series of social policies that allocated resources and social programs to Brazil's lower and marginalized classes. In addition, President's Lula's party, the Workers' party, has long been at the forefront of efforts to use participatory governance as a means to transfer resources into low-income communities, to expand the number and range of voices in the political system, and to habituate citizens into democratic practices (Avritzer 2002; 2009; Keck, 1992). Brazilian municipalities are worldwide leaders in the adoption of participatory governance institutions. During the 2001–4 mayoral administration period, when the survey was conducted, nearly 25 per cent of Brazil's population lived in a municipality using participatory budgeting (Wampler and Avritzer, 2005). In addition, tens of thousands of public policy management councils (*conselhos*) have been implemented in the areas of education, health care, etc. (Avritzer, 2009; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007).

Participatory governance consists of state-sanctioned institutional processes that allow citizens to exercise *voice* and *vote*, which then results in the implementation of public policies that produce meaningful changes in citizens' lives. Participatory governance is a unique mode because of the dual emphasis on voice and vote, which is different from direct or deliberative democracy. Direct democracy focuses on state-level recall and referenda, but only allows citizens to express a binary choice with very little opportunity to engage their voice (Bowler and Donovan, 2002). Deliberative institutions, with *Deliberative Polling* being the most well known, often allow for voice but do not link votes by participants to binding decisions that require government officials to act in specific ways (Fishkin, 1993).

Brazil's participatory budgeting does not divorce participants from their local political environment; rather, the program is specifically designed to give interested citizens the right to reshape local policy outcomes.

In Brazil, participatory governance was part of an effort to expand how, when and where citizens engage each other and engage the state. There was an explicit effort to use these spaces as the means to encourage the empowerment of citizens, to establish public deliberations, to include citizens' voices in decision making and, finally, to promote new state processes to implement citizens' demands. Participatory governance was thus not simply an institutional arrangement to select policies but it was designed to reinforce the democratic practices that were emerging from civil society. Civil society participation shifted during the 1990s and 2000s as the extensive, public demonstrations against the military government that marked the 1980s ceased to be an active part of the political environment. Instead, civil society activists repositioned themselves in the new participatory governance architecture in order to continue their efforts to empower citizens, expand rights and hold local states accountable.

This article draws from an original survey administered to 833 citizens elected to leadership positions in a state-sanctioned participatory governance program, Brazil's municipal-level participatory budgeting. The article examines respondents' attitudes on *agenda setting*, the *political strategies* employed to secure policy outcomes, and their self-reported behaviors on institutional *arena shopping* (the use of different state venues to press their claims). Although this article focuses on Brazil's participatory budgeting, the findings presented here are generalizable to other forms of participatory governance that have expanded across the globe, such as community-driven development, participatory planning, etc. (see Fung and Wright, 2003; Gibson and Woolcock, 2008; Heller, 2000; Labonne and Chase, 2009).

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The first section describes for a general audience why participatory governance emerged in Brazil. Second, the basic rules and principles of participatory budgeting are introduced and briefly discussed. The third section reviews the expansion of Brazil's civil society in the 1980s and 1990s as well as what researchers know about citizens' behaviors in and around participatory institutions. The fourth section presents a demographic profile of the survey respondents. The fifth section focuses on a series of survey questions that tap into agenda setting, arena shopping and political strategies used within participatory budgeting to secure policy outcomes. Two different models are developed to explain variation in the respondents' attitudes and behaviors: an individual-level model that includes basic socio-economic factors as control variables, and a municipal-level model that includes demographic, social well-being, political and program-specific factors as control variables. The models are tested using logistic regression. The article concludes by locating the findings within larger debates on democratization, civil society and citizenship.

Why Democratic Innovation in Brazil?

Given Brazil's political and social history of political processes dominated by small groups of elites, a rather weak and limited civil society, extensive marginalization of large majorities of the population, and the expansion of rights based on government officials' inter-

ests rather than as the results of pressures from below, it was rather surprising that Brazil emerged during the 1990s and 2000s as a site of extensive democratic innovation and experimentation (Carvalho, 1987; Dagnino, 1994; Encarnación, 2003). There were several key political processes that made Brazil a fertile ground for re-imaging how new participatory governance institutions could be used to expand the boundaries of representative democracy.

First, the slow withdrawal of the military government (1964–85) during the 1970s and 1980s created the necessary political space for opposition groups to organize; the expansion of social movement and union activity across the 1980s created an energized civil society (Alvarez, 1990; Hochstetler and Keck, 2007; Jacobi, 1989; Keck, 1992). Second, the military government's two-party system (regime supporters in one party, all opposition in another party) was disbanded in 1979 and in its wake a multiparty system was developed, thereby allowing new parties, such as the Workers' party, to emerge (Mainwaring, 1986). Third, the progressive wing of the Catholic Church, associated with liberation theology, led a movement that mobilized extensive sectors of the population *and* helped to refine the moral and political basis for rights (Dagnino, 1994; Mainwaring, 1986).

The confluence of these interrelated political processes was the 1987–8 Constitutional Assembly, charged with writing a new constitution. The 1988 Constitution decentralized and 'municipalized' the federal system, with states and municipalities having greater control over resources and social service provision. The 1988 Constitution allows governments to establish participatory processes should they choose to create new institutions and programs (Avritzer, 2009). The 1988 Constitution also expanded the number of collective social rights (e.g. right to education, housing, health care, etc.). Although the Brazilian government has been unable to meet constitutional guarantees that all Brazilians have access to new social rights, the inclusion of these rights is understood by many political activists to be a significant advance because it established a clear institutional framework that citizens could use to pressure governments to act.

Subsequent to the Constitutional Assembly, competitive municipal elections allowed a small opposition party, the Workers' party, to win several key municipal elections in 1988 (São Paulo, Porto Alegre, Santo André) and 1992 (Belo Horizonte, Santos). Workers' party governments used their newly won authority to experiment with new forms of governing and participation (*conselhos*, participatory budgeting, conferences). Porto Alegre is now associated with the well-known Participatory Budgeting program (Abers, 2000; Baiocchi, 2005).

Participatory governance in Brazil now fills an institutional and political vacuum in the political and policy-making system, linking political elites to ordinary citizens as other mechanisms of democratic state–society intermediation are exceptionally weak in Brazil. Two traditional means of linking citizens to governing elites – the legislative branch and the party system – are not generally used in Brazil as mechanisms to funnel citizens' demands into public policy-making processes (Couto and Abrucio, 1995; Mainwaring, 1986; Samuels, 2004; 2006; Wampler, 2007). In the absence of a strong party system and in the presence of weak legislatures, participatory governance now occupies a crucial role *funneling* demands emerging from organized communities into the executive branch. The proliferation of participatory governance institutions in Brazil during the 1990s and 2000s provides

citizens and CSO activists with numerous opportunities to influence policy outcomes directly (Avritzer 2002; 2009; Baiocchi, 2005; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007; Santos, 2005; Tatagiba, 2002).

What is Participatory Budgeting?

Brazil's federal system provides municipalities with nearly 15 per cent of all public spending, which helps to explain why CSOs and politicians focus considerable attention on public policy and budgets at the municipal level (Montero, 2000). Brazilian mayors enjoy extensive autonomy, allowing them to initiate new programs with only minimal interference from municipal legislative chambers (Couto and Abrucio, 1995). Participatory budgeting emerged from direct negotiations between government officials and civil society leaders, as they sought to produce practical solutions to pressing needs (Abers, 2000; Avritzer, 2002; Fedozzi, 2000). These programs are housed within the mayoral administration and complement the legal and political responsibilities of mayors and municipal legislators.

Participatory budgeting is a year-long decision-making process through which citizens negotiate among themselves and with government officials in organized meetings over the allocation of new capital spending on public work projects and social services (see Baiocchi, 2005; Goldfrank, 2007). Citizens are mobilized to attend meetings during which they vote for public policies and elect community representatives. Participants pay increased attention to transparency and social justice in an effort to reform how local governments in Brazil have long functioned, which is often described as clientelistic and personalistic (Avritzer, 2002). In order to move beyond the 'private, behind-closed-doors' bargains that have long defined clientelistic exchanges in Brazil and Latin America, a key principle associated with participatory budgeting is that citizens should deliberate with their fellow citizens in public venues without the direct intervention of government officials (Avritzer, 2002). When government officials are directly involved in negotiations over resource allocation, they are supposed to act as an arbitrator between competing CSO demands or as a referee explaining how legal, administrative and budgetary constraints affect the viability of projects. Of course, we know that citizens often engage in private conversations and negotiations with public officials, so the key innovation associated with participatory budgeting is that citizens have the opportunity for deliberation and negotiation in public fora with their peers rather than having to rely so heavily on private deal making (Baiocchi, 2005).

Citizen participation is legally open to any interested individual. Participatory budgeting's rules encourage unorganized individuals to attend meetings due to low threshold requirements for electing a group's member to a leadership position. However, existing survey research demonstrates that the majority of survey respondents are likely to be affiliated with a CSO because the social justice rules allocate higher per capita budgetary outlays in low-income neighborhoods (Abers, 2000; Baiocchi, 2005; Nylén, 2002; 2003).

Civil Society Activism and the State

During the struggle against the military regime in the 1970s and 1980s, a central mobilizing tenet utilized by many social movements and CSOs was citizenship (*cidadania*), which advances the idea that Brazilians hold a series of social, political and civil rights that the state

must enforce. 'The right to have rights', an analytical tool developed by Hannah Arendt, was employed quite persuasively by Evelina Dagnino as her work shows how the expansion of civil society during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s was based on a growing awareness among CSO leaders and ordinary citizens that they had the right to be right-bearing members of the polity (Arendt, 1958; Dagnino, 1998). The renewal of Brazilian civil society was associated with an effort to place individual social rights provided by the state at the heart of transforming state–society interactions. Following the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, many social movements and CSOs sought to engage directly in co-governance – working closely with government officials to develop the social programs and new institutions that would allow them to *activate* the rights formally included in the 1988 Constitution.

During the 1980s mobilization of civil society, and complementary to the development of the 'right to have rights', there was the development of 'participatory publics', as argued by Leonardo Avritzer (2002). This concept sought to capture how the deliberative and organizational styles utilized by CSOs were significantly transformed in Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s. Many urban CSOs developed specific strategies within their organization to overcome pernicious political practices such as clientelism, by holding elections for the CSOs' leadership, engaging in internal deliberations over policy and political strategies, and making their meetings with public officials open to all members of their organizations. These ideas helped form the foundational logic of public deliberation practices and rules found in participatory budgeting. Wampler and Avritzer (2004) showed how these 'participatory public' CSOs forged alliances with the Workers' party in order to craft innovative institutions.

'The right to have rights' and 'participatory publics' are two conceptual anchors that expand our understanding of how civil society activity influenced the development of these new institutional formats. Citizens fought for the right to have a political voice in public deliberation processes; once in these new participatory venues, they sought to influence the distribution of public goods and resources in order to gain access to the social rights guaranteed under the 1988 Constitution. However, the extent of renewal is widely contested as there are divergent findings regarding how and if these participatory institutions have transformed basic state–society relations.

First, some researchers assert that participatory governance has done little to alter the basic state–society relationship. In these cases, clientelism is found to be alive and well within new participatory governance institutions as government officials exploit their control over resources to co-opt CSO leaders (Dagnino and Tatagiba, 2007; Navarro, 2003). The new institutional environment has not changed basic behaviors but, rather, has allowed clientelism to be inserted into the new policy-making sphere. Thus, 'the right to have rights' has not been activated, but government officials have drawn CSO leaders into the state-run institutions, wherein the interests of government officials supplant the interests of CSOs.

The research of Adrián Lavalle, Arnab Acharya and Peter Houtzager demonstrates that individuals involved in CSOs with multiple ties to political society (parties, government officials, bureaucrats, unions) are more likely to be involved in participatory institutions than those CSOs isolated from political society, which suggests that participatory governance

programs are not producing new state–society relations, but that the old wine is merely being transferred to a new bottle (Lavalle *et al.*, 2005). They also find that well-connected CSOs engage in arena shopping as they pursue their interests, which suggests that it is vital to account for how CSO activists work inside the state, parallel to the state and within civil society.

Gianpaulo Baiocchi focuses on three districts within the city of Porto Alegre (often cited as the most successful participatory program in Brazil) to demonstrate how the configuration of civil society in each district shaped individuals' and CSOs' participation in participatory budgeting; participatory institutions function differently in each district depending on the willingness and capacity of civil society activists to work with the new institution (Baiocchi, 2005). Baiocchi's work advances our understanding of the relational ties between state institutions and civil society as he helps to show how participatory budgeting was linked to the development of a new rights-based culture.

Wampler and Avritzer demonstrate that citizens involved in Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting changed their behavior as a result of their participation, which indicates that these new participatory institutions are sufficiently strong that they induce individuals to act differently (Wampler and Avritzer, 2004). They found that participants were far more likely to work within the participatory budgeting (PB) rules and *not* seek out direct, private contacts with government officials whereas prior to the adoption of participatory budgeting these citizens were more likely to engage in private exchanges with public officials.

Finally, William Nylen administered a survey to participants in two participatory budgeting programs in the Brazilian cities of Belo Horizonte and Betim (Nylen, 2002; 2003). He shows that there was little empowerment among the unorganized, but that organized members of civil society were able to gain access to new public spaces, which has produced the ‘“pluralization of democratic activism” and, therefore, the “democratization of democracy”’ (Nylen, 2003, p. 90). Nylen does not demonstrate how participation in a CSO affects behavior within participatory budgeting, with the exception of the finding that CSO activists ‘were also more likely to participate beyond the first year’ (Nylen, 2002, p. 137). Nylen's finding provides preliminary suggestive evidence that CSO activists and unaffiliated citizens behave differently in participatory budgeting.

All of these accounts are based on a limited number of cases and have not been tested at the individual level in any sort of systematic fashion. This article advances this debate significantly by using logistic regression to assess better whether participants' reported behaviors suggest a deepening of democracy or the continued use of clientelistic networks.

Case Selection of Municipality and Survey Respondents

To gauge how civil society activism affects individuals' attitudes, strategies and behaviors within participatory governance, a sub-national, most similar case research is used because almost all PB programs in Brazil have been at the municipal level of government (Snyder, 2001). The purpose of this research design is to assess whether the rules and practices associated with participatory budgeting are having similar effects in different political, social and economic settings. Two criteria were used to select the most similar participatory budgeting programs: municipalities with a population of at least 100,000 residents *and* an

active participatory budgeting program covering at least two mayoral administrations.¹ We selected the criterion of 100,000 residents because we wanted to compare cities that shared basic commonalities rather than trying to control for the effects of widely different population sizes. Of Brazil's 5,500 municipalities, 225 have at least 100,000 residents. Within the universe of Brazil's 225 large municipalities, 35 municipalities had participatory budgeting over two mayoral administrative periods as of November 2003 when the survey was conducted. From this group of 35, eleven municipalities were included in the research project, based on representative characteristics rather than through a random selection process. Variation in region, population size, the political party that initially adopted participatory budgeting, and length of participatory budgeting since its inception in each respective municipality was desired. We sought to avoid selecting all Workers' party governments, the primary political supporters of the adoption and diffusion of participatory budgeting, but the Workers' party is over-represented due to the selection criterion of having participatory budgeting over at least two mayoral administrative periods. Of the eleven municipalities included in the survey, two are from the northeastern part of Brazil: Recife and Campina Grande. Two are from the south: Porto Alegre and Blumenau. Seven municipalities are from the southeast: Rio Claro, Santo André, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Ipatinga, Niteroi and Vitoria.

Survey Respondents

The survey respondents were randomly selected from a pool of elected 'PB delegates' within each municipality.² During each annual or biannual cycle of participatory budgeting, participants elect 'PB delegates'. The responsibility of PB delegates is to act as the liaison between the municipal government and individual participants, negotiate with other PB delegates and government officials over budgetary and implementation problems, resolve internal disputes, exercise oversight over implementation of public policy and elect, from among their members, a smaller commission (PB councilors) to attend weekly meetings and vote on rule changes.

Many CSOs rotate the members who will stand for election as a PB delegate to share financial and time burdens (bus fares and evening/weekend meetings) as well as to prevent any single actor gaining control over how the community's interests are represented within participatory budgeting. The majority of the PB delegates included in the survey are CSO leaders and members, but 15 per cent included in the survey sample are citizens unaffiliated with a CSO but presumed to be more civically engaged than the average citizen because they are taking the time to attend a public meeting and are willing to stand for election. Having four different types of activist provides a strong test to identify how individuals' type of civil society activism affects their attitudes and behavior.

In order to identify whether the survey respondent was a leader, a current member, a past member or an unaffiliated but civically engaged citizen, three questions help to categorize an individual's type of civil society participation. Survey respondents were asked: 'Are you currently a member of a community or voluntary association?' If yes, 'Are you currently a leader in this organization?' These two questions provide the evidence that enables us to establish whether the individual was a CSO leader or member. If the respondent answered no to the first question, we asked: 'Have you been a member of a community or voluntary

association during the past five years?’ Given the fluidity with which people enter and exit semi-formal voluntary associations in Brazil, this latter question identifies whether individuals’ previous participation left any residual effects that induced them to act differently than unaffiliated citizens.

The survey is, in some senses, an elite survey because of the focus on the attitudes, strategies and behaviors of individuals who were prominent enough in their community or organization to be elected as a PB delegate. And yet we must also keep in mind that nearly two-thirds of the respondents lived in households that earned less than US\$400 per month, which suggests that the PB delegates are leaders within their own communities but can hardly be construed as political or economic elites. Basic socio-economic characteristics of the CSO leaders, current members, former members and unaffiliated but civically engaged citizens who participated in the survey show minor differences, as presented below in Table 1. A large majority of participants are members of CSOs, suggesting that these organizations are important conduits for delivering citizens to this type of participatory democracy.

There are two noteworthy socio-economic differences among the respondents. First, 60 per cent of current CSO members are women, but only 46 per cent of self-declared leaders are women. Although this suggests that Brazilian CSOs have not achieved gender equality among their leadership, it is important to emphasize that nearly half of the CSOs’ leaders are women, which is far better than most other political institutions in Brazil (especially political parties). Second, compared to members of the other three categories, CSO leaders have the highest education levels but lowest monthly household income. It is impossible to make causal inferences based on these differences but it is possible that individuals with higher education but with diminished economic opportunities have the time, resources and capacity to act as CSO leaders (Krishna, 2002). Participatory budgeting programs appear to have partially mitigated the often-cited high-income bias associated with traditional forms of democratic participation due to political and institutional incentives that create specific opportunities for low-income citizens (Verba *et al.*, 1995).

Table 1: Demographic Profile (per cent)

	<i>CSO leader</i>	<i>Current CSO member</i>	<i>Former CSO member</i>	<i>Unaffiliated, but civically engaged citizen</i>
Female	46	60	53	52
Monthly household income of US\$400 or less	66	63	59	62
Completed high school or more	55	45	53	55
Participate in <i>conselhos</i>	50	21	22	15
Union membership	17	16	12	15
Community received PB public goods	68	66	77	64
Total included in the survey	45	29	11	15

Source: ‘PB Comparative Survey’.

Finally, the second to last row, 'Community received PB public goods' is striking because two-thirds of survey respondents live in a community that received a public good from the PB process. This suggests that credible state commitment to PB is attracting people who would not normally participate in public venues – namely individuals not affiliated with a CSO. Thus, PB programs are able to induce participation among sectors that would not ordinarily engage in public fora.

Agenda Setting, Arena Shopping and Political Strategies

To capture the differences in attitudes, strategies and behaviors among the four types of civil society participant, three areas are analyzed: (1) agenda setting; (2) the political strategies used to secure public policy benefits; and (3) arena shopping. It is possible, of course, that survey respondents may report behaviors based on how they believe they should be acting rather than what they are actually doing. A rich body of ethnographic research allows us to confirm that the self-reporting behaviors of individual participants in this survey are similar to what researchers have found through ethnographic work (see Abers, 2000; Avritzer and Navarro, 2003; Baiocchi 2003; 2005; Wampler, 2007).

Agenda setting is analyzed broadly and narrowly. Broadly, was the adoption of participatory budgeting driven by government officials or by civil society actors? This line of analysis assesses respondents' attitudes regarding who they believed was the principal actor behind the adoption of participatory budgeting in their municipality. More narrowly, who set the meetings' agendas? This question assesses respondents' attitudes regarding who they believe establishes the content to be debated at each meeting. If government officials are perceived to be the primary actor in both types of agenda setting, then we can surmise that this new institution follows a long tradition of policy making in Brazil (and Latin America more widely) whereby executives (mayors, governors, presidents) control the political and policy agenda. Conversely, if civil society actors are perceived to be contributing to either type of agenda setting, then state–society relations are being transformed because citizens are asserting their voice over the local state.

Second, *political strategies* tap into the means employed by PB delegates to secure their preferred policy outcomes. Respondents were asked to identify the political actors (e.g. government officials, bureaucrats, citizens, other CSOs) they sought out to gain the necessary support to secure the inclusion of their policy project in the budget as well as policy implementation. This line of analysis taps into whether the elected PB delegates pursue a strategy that promotes alliances among citizens or if they use a political strategy that exploits direct, personal access to government officials. Under participatory budgeting rules, projects are voted on in public fora in which government officials do not have a vote, which means that survey respondents who turn to government officials are bypassing the rules of the game. This does not mean that working with government officials is illegitimate or undemocratic, but it suggests that respondents who seek out government officials during the negotiation processes are unable or unwilling to take advantage of the new deliberative opportunities made available to them.

Arena shopping is the third area analyzed. Civil society activists and engaged citizens are likely to be involved in multiple formal and informal venues as they pursue their interests (Verba *et al.*, 1995). Is there an association between individuals' type of civil society

participation and their behaviors in multiple state institutions? If respondents' type of civil society activism best accounts for strategies used in other political settings, then we can assert that civil society activity, which is rewarded in participatory budgeting, is having a positive effect on state–society relations in other venues.

Models and Results

To demonstrate how civil society activity and participatory governance affect individuals' attitudes and behavior, seven dependent variables are tested with two different models (individual level and municipal level). Respondents were asked the following questions and they were provided with five or six possible responses (including 'don't know'). The responses were then re-coded into a dichotomous dependent variable (see the Appendix for coding information) based on whether the response was more closely associated with government officials or with civil society activity.

Dependent Variables

Agenda Setting

- Who was most responsible for the adoption of participatory budgeting in your community?
- Who defines the debate within participatory budgeting meetings?

Political Strategies

- Whose support is most important to ensure the inclusion of your project in the budget?
- Whose support is most important to ensure the implementation of a selected project?

Arena Shopping

- Are public goods secured outside participatory budgeting processes?
- If yes, how are policy benefits secured outside participatory budgeting?
- Do you participate in parallel participatory governance institutions (*conselhos*)?

The first model is an individual-level model, which includes dummy variables for CSO leaders, CSO members and former CSO members. The variable 'unaffiliated but civically engaged citizen' serves as the baseline against which we can interpret the other effects. Education, income, gender and age are control variables, allowing assessment of how basic socio-economic characteristics affect responses (see the Appendix for coding information). The last variable included, PB benefits, is derived from a question on the survey, 'Has your community received a direct policy benefit from participatory budgeting?' This question assesses whether respondents' attitudes and behaviors are affected by tangible benefits accrued by their community from participatory budgeting.

Individual-Level Results

The first two columns in Table 2 report the results from the agenda-setting category. The results of column one will be reported below, when discussing Table 3. Column two reports the result of the second *agenda-setting* variable. The only statistically significant variable is

Table 2: Individual-Level Logistic Regression

	Agenda setting		Political strategies			Arena shopping		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
	Who drives adoption?	Who sets internal debate?	Who is key negotiation partner?	How to ensure project implementation?	Are public goods secured outside PB?	How are public goods secured outside PB?	Other participatory institutions?	
CSO leader	-0.220* (0.115)	0.164 (0.115)	0.266** (0.113)	0.435*** (0.113)	0.362** (0.118)	0.420* (0.202)	0.780*** (0.131)	
CSO member	-0.123 (0.123)	0.061 (0.122)	0.266** (0.120)	0.342** (0.120)	0.147 (0.127)	0.441* (0.218)	0.148 (0.144)	
Former CSO member	-0.184 (0.153)	0.148 (0.154)	-0.150 (0.147)	0.131 (0.148)	0.188 (0.156)	0.407 (0.252)	0.152 (0.177)	
Age	0.007 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)	0.011 (0.006)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.024** (0.007)	
Education	-0.011 (0.020)	-0.040 (0.047)	0.051 (0.047)	-0.038 (0.0456)	0.007 (0.022)	-0.020 (0.031)	-0.030 (0.031)	
Income	-0.033 (0.051)	-0.073 (0.053)	0.008 (0.052)	0.047 (0.050)	0.131** (0.050)	-0.071 (0.074)	0.093 (0.052)	
PB benefits	-0.016 (0.161)	0.914*** (0.164)	0.776*** (0.162)	0.508** (1.60)	0.298 (0.162)	0.052 (0.128)	0.308 (0.173)	
Gender	0.343*** (0.076)	0.016 (0.164)	-0.048 (0.078)	-0.185 (0.075)	-0.208** (0.076)	0.110 (0.115)	-0.089 (0.080)	
Constant	-0.403 (0.386)	-0.091 (0.441)	-0.665 (0.442)	0.003 (0.424)	-0.220 (0.390)	0.953 (0.563)	-1.955*** (0.444)	
Log likelihood	-1003	-957	-974	-1035	-1003	-453	-934	
N	775	731	770	773	762	335	806	

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Note: Figures in parentheses are absolute T-ratios.

Table 3: Municipal-Level Logistic Regression

	Agenda setting		Political strategies			Arena shopping		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
	Who drives adoption?	Who sets internal debate?	Who is key negotiation partner?	How to ensure project implementation?	Are public goods secured outside PB?	How are public goods secured outside PB?	Other participatory institutions?	
CSO leader	-0.231* (0.114)	0.203 (0.111)	0.282** (0.110)	0.444*** (0.110)	0.380** (0.115)	-0.271 (0.196)	0.752*** (0.132)	
CSO member	-0.083 (0.120)	0.083 (0.117)	0.243* (0.117)	0.327*** (0.116)	0.133 (0.123)	-0.300 (0.209)	0.150 (0.144)	
Former CSO member	-0.121 (0.151)	0.110 (0.147)	-0.160 (0.144)	0.221 (0.143)	0.237 (0.153)	0.322 (0.243)	0.136 (0.179)	
Age	-7.316** (2.189)	-1.413 (2.275)	3.183 (2.278)	-1.449 (2.14)	0.645 (2.169)	2.880 (3.626)	-0.452 (2.334)	
Education	0.103*** (0.021)	-0.030 (0.021)	-0.083*** (0.022)	-0.037 (0.20)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.069* (0.032)	-0.063*** (0.022)	
Income	0.119*** (0.031)	0.068* (0.033)	0.027 (0.033)	0.037 (0.031)	-0.055 (0.031)	-0.017 (0.047)	0.059 (0.035)	
PB benefits	0.160 (0.107)	0.093 (0.105)	-0.005 (0.221)	-0.114 (0.101)	0.110 (0.104)	0.106 (0.155)	-0.476*** (0.113)	
Gender	-0.046 (0.501)	-0.779 (0.486)	-0.812 (0.510)	-0.289 (0.470)	-1.279** (0.494)	-0.331 (0.717)	2.16*** (0.530)	
Constant	4.781** (1.765)	1.325 (1.831)	-1.795 (1.835)	1.430 (1.733)	0.260 (1.773)	-2.166 (2.987)	-1.248 (1.881)	
Log likelihood	-1020	-1004	-1003	-1077	-1027	-455	-927	
N	778	754	795	798	770	338	831	

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Note: Figures in parentheses are absolute T-ratios.

'PB benefits', which means that respondents who report that their community received a direct benefit from participatory budgeting were more likely to assert that it is citizens, and not government officials, who set the agenda for public meetings. Citizens believe they control the policy agenda when their community receives direct benefits from participatory budgeting. Therefore, *citizens are empowered in these state-run participatory governance programs when the government has established a credible commitment to implement the projects selected in PB.*³

The third and fourth columns, which focus on the *political strategies* used to secure public policies, demonstrate that CSO leaders and members build support within civil society to secure their policy preferences. Participatory budgeting's rules are designed to induce deliberation and negotiation among participants prior to a public vote that determines which public works projects will be included in the annual municipal budget. The responses of CSO leaders and CSO members are statistically significant, which shows that they sought out other members of civil society rather than government officials to secure the inclusion of the project in the annual budget. CSO leaders were 6 per cent more likely than CSO members to report that they primarily seek out other CSOs to secure the inclusion of their projects in the budget, which indicates that CSO leaders, rather than CSO members, were the most likely to adopt strategies based on 'the right to have rights' and 'participatory publics'.

As also reported in column 3, respondents who live in communities that successfully secured public policies from participatory budgeting (PB benefits) are also statistically significant. There is a strong empowering effect as state compliance leads people to believe that they set the agenda. When comparing CSO leaders to 'PB winners', we find that CSO leaders are 17 per cent more likely than the latter to report that they work with other CSOs rather than government officials, which suggests that involvement in a CSO gives these respondents a greater capacity to work with other CSOs than does living in a community that received PB benefits. This underscores that *citizens' type of civil society involvement strongly affects their actions within participatory governance institutions, which is an important finding because it reminds us that the configuration of civil society (history, density, breadth) will significantly impact the degree to which participatory governance can and will transform state-society relations.*

Project implementation is the subject of the fourth column; it is a key category because many public works projects in Brazil are officially entered into the budget but never move beyond this policy-making stage. Again, the responses of CSO leaders, CSO members and 'PB benefits' are all statistically significant, which indicates that these respondents were more likely to seek out the support of other CSOs during the implementation stage of participatory budgeting than to strike bargains with government officials to secure policy outputs. Thus, CSO leaders, CSO members and 'PB benefits' respondents adhered to the rules of the game, which involves extensive oversight and monitoring practices that enable participants to follow a project closely as it moves from inclusion in the budget to actual implementation. CSO leaders were 5 per cent more likely than CSO members and 8 per cent more likely than 'PB winners' (who were not CSO leaders or CSO members) to assert that they sought out other CSOs. Again, *CSO leaders are more likely to draw upon their mobilizational strengths to help activate accountability processes in order to ensure government compliance with decisions made via participatory budgeting.*

Arena shopping is the focus of the fifth, sixth and seventh columns. Forty per cent of respondents report that their neighborhood successfully obtained a specific policy benefit through means other than participatory budgeting (column 5), suggesting that participatory budgeting is just one channel among many used by community leaders. The sixth column shows that when CSO leaders and CSO members move outside participatory budgeting, they report that they are more likely to rely on civil society mobilization (such as public demonstrations and group lobbying) than to seek out direct contacts with government officials. CSO leaders thus rely on inter- and intra-group 'bonds of solidarity', as developed within civil society, before they turn to pressure government leaders through group activity (Alexander, 2006). The seventh column shows yet another way that CSO leaders influence the public debate and policy outcomes. CSO leaders were the most likely to use a parallel participatory process, the issue-oriented councils (*conselhos*) in areas such as health care, education and the environment.

In sum, it is principally CSO leaders who are taking the time and energy to participate in multiple participatory institutions. CSO activists engaged in participatory budgeting seek out their fellow CSOs to secure public goods inside and outside participatory budgeting, indicating that individuals' type of participation in civil society has a substantial impact on how they act inside a state-sanctioned participatory institution. *This evidence demonstrates that CSO leaders elected to leadership positions within participatory institutions are now engaging in behaviors that reinforce deliberative, democratic decision-making processes.*

Of course, it is feasible that CSO activists behave differently across municipal lines (Avritzer, 2009; Avritzer and Navarro, 2003; Putnam, 1993; Wampler, 2007). The available data do not allow us to measure density of civil society, but we can assess how individuals' responses are conditioned by municipal-specific characteristics.

Municipal-Level Analysis

Eleven municipalities were included in the survey. Three municipal-level and two program-specific control variables are included in the second model. The model also includes the same three types of civil society participation. Unaffiliated but civically engaged citizens are the baseline and their results are reported as the constant.

There are three municipal context variables. The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the municipality's overall standard of living (income, education and health comprise the index). Given that the earliest and most successful cases of PB were in wealthier municipalities, this variable is used to assess whether a municipality's standard of living affects the strategies and behaviors of the different types of CSO actor (Wampler and Avritzer, 2005). Municipal population is included because previous research demonstrates that increases in population are positively correlated with respondents' belief that they were able to exercise authority in participatory budgeting, a finding that runs counter to the assumption that participatory democracy is likely to function best in small towns (Wampler, 2007). Mayoral vote difference is included to account for how the level of mayoral electoral competition affects the strategies and behaviors of the survey respondents. This is measured by the difference in the percentage of the vote share of two top mayoral candidates in the first round of voting in the 2000 election. We surmise that a more competitive electoral arena (narrower margin of victory) makes the winning mayor more attentive to the

demands and interests of CSO leaders, who are actively sought out by politicians due to their role as intermediaries between candidates and voters.

Two program-specific variables are included in the model. First, we expect that the 'total number of years' of a participatory budgeting program will affect delegates' strategies and behaviors. As participatory budgeting programs consolidate, participants are more likely to select strategies that allow them to do well under the institution's rules because the institutionalization of a specific set of rules allows individuals and groups to devise clear strategies. We surmise that program consolidation is positively associated with respondents seeking out their fellow citizens rather than government officials. The second program-specific variable is labeled 'continuous PB', which is defined as the continuous management of participatory budgeting by the same political coalition since its adoption in the municipality. We surmise that consistency in leadership is associated with inducing PB delegates to adhere to the rules of the game because administrative stability helps consolidate participatory budgeting's rules, thereby reinforcing new behaviors. Overall the results in Table 3 mirror the results from Table 2, which suggests that individuals' type of activity in civil society is a stronger predictor of reported attitudes and behaviors than the specific context of each individual's participatory budgeting program.

The first two columns of Table 3 report the results from the agenda-setting category (questions and coding are the same as in Table 2). In column 1, CSO leader is statistically significant and negatively signed, which means that CSO leaders believe that government officials are behind the adoption of PB. This complements the findings in Table 2. The results presented in column 1 show that CSO leaders believe that government officials' efforts, rather than their own, best explain the adoption of this new participatory policy-making process. This finding runs counter to the political narrative generated by government officials, but these attitudes correspond to the vast majority of scholarly work on participatory budgeting, which highlights the crucial role of government officials in these processes (Abers, 2000; Baiocchi, 2005; Goldfrank, 2007; Wampler, 2007). One implication of this finding is that CSO leaders are acutely aware of how their authority in participatory budgeting is bracketed by the political interests of the government officials who administer the program. A second statistically significant finding is that the total years of PB programs is also statistically significant and positively signed, which tells us that survey respondents in the municipalities with older PB programs (Porto Alegre, Ipatinga, Belo Horizonte) were more likely to believe that their programs were adopted through the efforts of CSO activists, which is also in line with most scholarly analyses.

In the second column, 'who sets the debate', the only statistically significant factor is total years, which indicates that survey respondents who live in municipalities with a longer-lasting participatory budgeting program are more likely to believe that it is citizens who set the agenda. This is best explained because older programs are more likely to have distributed more resources to a larger number of communities over time and because the pioneering programs were adopted through the joint efforts of CSOs and government officials.

The third and fourth columns complement the findings reported in Table 2. As shown in column three, CSO leaders and members report that they seek out other CSO activists to secure the inclusion of their project(s) in the annual budget, which shows that the type of CSO participation is more important than the specific factors associated with a municipi-

pality or its participatory budgeting program. Similarly, to secure policy implementation, *CSO leaders and CSO members are also likely to seek out other activists, suggesting that alliances formed within participatory budgeting provide valuable political resources enabling low-income activists successfully to pressure government officials.* CSO leaders and their members are following the rules of the game – they are forging alliances with other CSOs first to secure the inclusion of their preferred policies in the municipality’s annual budget and then they are working in tandem to maintain the necessary pressure on government officials to ensure project implementation.

The fifth, sixth and seventh columns focus on arena shopping. CSO leaders are likely to have secured policy benefits outside PB, demonstrating their ability to work in multiple arenas simultaneously. This again complements the findings in Table 2, which means that CSO leaders utilize multiple channels to seek out government support. Interestingly, a smaller vote differential between the top two mayoral candidates in the first round of voting is associated with the respondents’ ability to secure resources outside participatory budgeting. This suggests that mayors in more competitive electoral systems are more likely to seek out CSO leaders to help distribute public goods, likely due to CSO leaders’ role as intermediaries between voters and candidates. The evidence suggests that CSO leaders take advantage of participatory budgeting’s rules to leverage their strengths better – group mobilization and deliberation – while also gaining direct access to resources from government officials in highly competitive electoral environments. Thus, research on participatory governance must be attentive to the broader political context into which these programs are inserted.

The seventh column presents the results regarding whether survey respondents participated in parallel participatory institutions (*conselhos*). The ‘continuous PB’ variable is negatively signed and statistically significant, which means that the perceived instability of control by a single political party over the mayor’s office (which administers participatory budgeting) induces CSO leaders to seek other venues to secure their policy goals. From CSOs’ strategic position, the fluctuations in mayoral leadership would make it unwise for activists to pursue their interests in a single institution (participatory budgeting) housed within the mayoral administration.

In sum, the findings in Table 3 demonstrate that the respondents’ type of civil society activity, primarily individuals in leadership positions but also regular CSO members, produced significantly different attitudes, behaviors and strategies from those exercised by former CSO members or unaffiliated but civically engaged citizens. CSO leaders are the most likely to seek out their colleagues from civil society, which provides compelling evidence that individuals’ type of civil society participation significantly affects their behavior within state-sanctioned participatory institutions.

Concluding Remarks

Over the past 30 years, Brazilian civil society and its relationship with the state have been transformed, due to the consolidation of democratic rule, the re-engineering of the economy in the 1990s, the economic boom of the 2000s, the allocation of public resources to poor Brazilians via *Bolsa Família* (School Stipend) as well as the proliferation of a new participatory governance architecture that has created opportunities for hundreds of thou-

sands of Brazilian citizens to be directly involved in public policy making. The focus of this article used individual-level data drawn from participatory budgeting to assess how these new venues may be contributing to Brazil's transformation.

In this article's first paragraph I identified that citizen participation in civil society organizations is believed to positively affect a vast array of political, social and policy outcomes: state performance, citizen empowerment, the quality of democracy, public deliberation and citizenship rights are reportedly enhanced by the presence of active citizen involvement in public life and state institutions. This article demonstrates that Brazilian participatory governance institutions have successfully induced the most active members of civil society – CSO leaders – to use new political practices within participatory governance institutions as well as in parallel venues. *CSO leaders consistently reported that they engage in setting the agenda of public meetings, that their political strategies are based on forging alliances with other CSOs and using political mobilization tactics in civil society, and that their political activities outside participatory budgeting now also rely heavily on their engagement with other CSOs.* This evidence demonstrates that participatory governance now allows CSO leaders to draw upon practices developed in civil society ('participatory publics' and 'the right to have rights') and to use these practices in pursuit of their political and policy goals inside state-sanctioned institutions. The significance of this finding is that CSO leaders involved in Brazil's participatory budgeting are no longer dependent on private negotiations with government officials to secure public resources. Although it would be naïve to claim that clientelism and patronage politics have been eliminated, the individual-level data clearly demonstrate that new forms of political negotiation are being consolidated in these new institutional settings. Thus, alongside Brazil's strong economic growth during the 2000s, new forms of deliberation, negotiation and interest mediation are being used, which enhance the quality of Brazil's democracy.

A second key finding is that citizen empowerment is being advanced in two ways. First, when survey respondents reside in communities that received public goods via participatory budgeting, they were likely to report that they primarily worked with CSO organizations. Second, *CSO leaders consistently reported that their political strategies to obtain public resources were based on their direct negotiation and engagement with other CSOs, which provides empirical proof that 'bonds of solidarity' are fostered and maintained in PB* (Alexander, 2006). Citizens are empowered due to credible state commitment to participatory budgeting, which is a remarkable and important shift in the context of Brazil and Latin America. The state is now becoming responsive to citizens' demands as the result of participatory budgeting.

Improvements in state performance and citizen empowerment, in turn, directly affect the quality of democracy and citizenship rights. The quality of democracy is deepened as CSO leaders use public formats to engage each other during important decision-making processes. The entry of low-income and poor residents into formal policy-making venues allows them to introduce new ideas and interests into debates that were not traditionally open to them. The expansion of the debate is an important first step but what is most important is that government officials implement the citizens' decisions. Public deliberation is the means to achieve improvements in public infrastructure and social well-being. Citizenship rights are extended as citizens use newly won political rights to work for the

expansion of state-sponsored social rights. This article breaks ground because it provides individual-level empirical evidence to demonstrate that CSO leaders' reported behaviors support public deliberation and negotiation processes, both of which are associated with improving the quality of democracy.

Brazil's transformation during the 1990s and 2000s is partly driven by the expansion of participatory governance. This article drew from one institutional type, participatory budgeting, but there are others: public policy management councils (*conselhos*) and thematic conferences provide opportunities for hundreds of thousands of Brazilians to be directly involved in policy-making deliberations and decision making. What makes the recent period in Brazil so remarkable is that it is both economic and political changes that are reshaping how citizens engage the state and each other. These participatory governance venues are integral components of the decrease in social and political exclusion, which have long been hallmarks of Brazilian life. The expansion of citizens' voice and vote in ongoing public policy-making venues are essential parts of producing new social and political relations in Brazil.

Appendix

Dependent Variables

DV #1 Q: What was the most important factor that led to the adoption of PB in your city? Responses coded as 0 were 'mayor's party' and 'personal initiative of the mayor'; responses coded as 1 were 'mobilization of community' and 'social movements'.

DV #2 Q: Who has the most influence in setting the agenda for the topics that will be debated within PB? Responses coded as 0 were 'mayor', 'government officials' and 'government bureaucrats'. Response coded as 1 was 'PB delegates'.

DV #3 Q: In the past two years, has your neighborhood secured a specific policy benefit outside the participatory budgeting process? Responses coded as 1 = yes; 0 = no.

DV #4 Q: How were these public benefits secured? Responses coded as 0 were 'through personal contacts with city council members' and 'through personal contacts with the mayor'. Responses coded as 1 were 'by placing pressure on the municipal government through the mobilization of the community' and 'through an issue-oriented council (*conselho*)'.

DV#5 Q: Have you ever been elected as a representative to a municipal issue-based council? Responses coded as 1 = yes; 0 = no.

DV #6 Q: To have a public work included in PB, in your opinion, the support of which of the following groups is most important? Responses coded as 0 were 'support of the municipal government' and 'support of city council members'. Responses coded 1 were 'support of own CSO or community group', 'support of other organized groups' and 'support of other PB delegates'.

DV#7 Q: After your public work has been formally included in the budget, the support of which of the following groups is most important to ensure that it is actually implemented?

Responses coded as 0 were 'support of the municipal government' and 'support of city council members'. Responses coded as 1 were 'support of own CSO or community group', 'support of other organized groups' and 'support of other PB delegates'.

Independent Variables

Individual-Level Model. CSO leader: (0 = non-leader, 1 = leader); CSO member: (0 = non-member, 1 = member); CSO former member: (0 = not a former member, 1 = former member); gender: (0 = male, 1 = female); PB benefits: (0 = never received, 1 = received); education: (1 = don't know how to read or write, 2 = some elementary school, 3 = completed elementary school, 4 = some high school, 5 = completed high school, 6 = some college, 7 = college graduate); income (household): (1 = 0–2 minimum monthly salaries, 2 = 3–5 minimum monthly salaries, 3 = 6–9 minimum monthly salaries, 4 = 10–20 minimum monthly salaries, 5 = more than 20 minimum monthly salaries).

Municipal-Level Model. Human Development Index: interval; population: interval & rescaled so that unit of variable is in terms of millions of people; total number of years: interval; percent of mayor's election victory: interval; continuous management dichotomous (1 = yes; 0 = no).

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Notes

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- 1 A minimum of two mayoral administrations is a criterion for inclusion because it often takes participants and governments several years to determine how this complex decision-making model works, how it should be adapted to meet local needs, and which strategies should be utilized to improve governance and to increase the likelihood of securing public goods.
- 2 The survey was initially conducted by the Instituto Ethos between 25 November and 10 December 2003 in eight municipalities. After completing the survey, we added three additional municipalities (Campina Grande, Niterói and Vitória) to better control for the influence of the Workers' party (PT). The second round of surveys was completed in the final two weeks of April 2004. The survey is a random sample of PB delegates within each municipality. There were 833 total surveys completed out of 8,500 possible participants. The distribution among the different municipalities was: Porto Alegre (60), Ipatinga (60), Belo Horizonte (60), Santo André (60), São Paulo (300), Recife (60), Blumenau (60), Rio Claro (30), Campina Grande (60), Niterói (60) and Vitória (23). We sampled a larger number in São Paulo because the municipal program had 4,500 PB delegates, far larger than the other municipalities. In all cities, with the exception of Santo André, the surveys were conducted by telephone. To generate an appropriate phone list of current delegates, the author contacted each municipal government to obtain the names and phone numbers of individuals who were serving as PB delegates in 2003. In the municipalities of São Paulo, Ipatinga, Blumenau, Rio Claro and Recife complete lists of all delegates were obtained. Individuals were then randomly selected. In Porto Alegre and Campina Grande we were able to obtain 50 per cent of the appropriate numbers, from which we generated a random selection. In Belo Horizonte, Niterói and Vitória we obtained less than 30 per cent of potential names and phone numbers, from which we generated a random selection. In Santo André, surveys were conducted in person at PB neighborhood meetings.
- 3 It is possible that respondents have convinced themselves that they exercise authority as a justification to account to themselves (and their families) for the amount of time that they dedicate to the new participatory process. We cannot dismiss this explanation out of hand, so a reasonable interpretation of the results is limited to the assertion that individuals living in a community directly benefiting from participatory budgeting strongly feel that they, the citizens, have been empowered to affect public policy outcomes directly.

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