

THE BRAZILIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: OVER-REPRESENTATION, AMBIVALENCE, DECENTRALIZATION AND INSTRUMENTALISM

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The main goal of the article is the analysis of primary data from the Brazilian International Development Cooperation (Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional – Cobradi). It characterizes the Brazilian participation in the International Development Cooperation (IDC) agenda based on the implementation of the country's cooperation for other developing countries. Relying on data from the Cobradi research gathered by the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada – Ipea) since 2010 and by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD), the article identifies four characteristics of the Brazilian IDC since 2005: over-representation, ambivalence, decentralization and instrumentalism. Although the article focuses essentially on identifying regularities and trends, it is inevitable to conclude that Brazil needs a more integrated IDC management system, as well as a framework to assess the impacts of public investment on this agenda, particularly the country's contributions to international institutions.

Keywords: South-South cooperation; international development cooperation; development financing; Cobradi; Brazilian foreign policy.

A COOPERAÇÃO BRASILEIRA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO INTERNACIONAL: SOBRRERREPRESENTAÇÃO, AMBIVALENCIA, DESCENTRALIZAÇÃO E INSTRUMENTALISMO

Este artigo tem como foco principal a análise de dados primários da Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional (Cobradi). O seu principal objetivo é caracterizar a inserção brasileira na agenda de Cooperação Internacional para o Desenvolvimento (CID) a partir da implementação das iniciativas de cooperação prestada pelo país. Baseando-se em dados da pesquisa sobre a Cobradi conduzida pelo Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea) desde 2010 e do Comitê de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento da Organização para a Cooperação e o Desenvolvimento Econômico (DAC/OCDE), o artigo identifica quatro regularidades da CID prestada pelo Brasil desde 2005: sobrerrepresentação, ambivalência, descentralização e instrumentalismo. Ainda que o artigo se concentre essencialmente na identificação de regularidades e tendências, é inevitável concluir que o Brasil precisa de um sistema mais integrado de gestão da CID, além de uma estrutura para avaliar os impactos do investimento público nesta agenda, particularmente das contribuições do país para instituições internacionais.

Palavras-chave: cooperação Sul-Sul; Cooperação Internacional para o Desenvolvimento; financiamento para o desenvolvimento; Cobradi; política externa brasileira.

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LA COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL PARA EL DESARROLLO BRASILEÑA: SOBRRERREPRESENTACIÓN, AMBIVALENCIA, DESCENTRALIZACIÓN E INSTRUMENTALISMO

El foco principal del artículo es el análisis de datos primarios de la Cooperación Brasileña para el Desarrollo Internacional (Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional – Cobradi). Su principal objetivo es caracterizar la inclusión de Brasil en la agenda de la Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (CID) a partir de la implementación de la cooperación del país con otros países en desarrollo. Con base en los datos de la investigación de la Cobradi implementada por el Instituto de Investigación Económica Aplicada (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada – Ipea) desde 2010 y del Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (CAD/OCDE), el artículo identifica cuatro regularidades de la CID ofrecida por Brasil desde 2005: sobrerrepresentación, ambivalencia, descentralización e instrumentalismo. Aunque el artículo se enfoque esencialmente en identificar regularidades y tendencias, es inevitable concluir que Brasil necesita un sistema de gestión de CID más integrado, así como un marco para evaluar los impactos de la inversión pública en esta agenda, particularmente las contribuciones del país a las instituciones internacionales.

Palabras clave: cooperación Sur-Sur; Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo; financiamiento para el desarrollo; Cobradi; política exterior brasileña.

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1 INTRODUCTION

International development cooperation is an expression of the external behavior of nation-states, intergovernmental organizations (IOs), and other international actors, even if they are not formally considered to be subjects of International Public Law, such as civil society organizations and market actors. Putting it bluntly, international cooperation is not only limited to official cooperation. It has acquired characteristics that make it difficult to define it with formal, simple, and limited mechanisms. However, despite this vast universe of possibilities for international cooperation, this paper will focus only on the official expenditures and initiatives of international development cooperation officially conducted by states, given that they are still the main actors in International Relations and the main subject of International Public Law.

From a conceptual standpoint, international cooperation among states involve a convergence of interests, or the need to solve a common problem. Therefore, it is a phenomenon that results from the existence of shared problems or objectives that cannot be overcome by a single state or even a limited group of states (Kaul et al., 2003). The best-known examples are certainly those linked to global problems with diffuse consequences, such as climate change, epidemiological surveillance, sustainable management of living and non-living resources, including marine life,

among others. Less well-known, however, are the problems that do not yet have an immediate connection to the Anthropocene in the specialized literature, such as the planetary boundaries (IPCC, 2023). Other agendas, such as the regulation of foreign trade activities, the regulation of international investment flows and the control of different migratory flows, for example, still lack greater attention from decision-makers in the multilateral arenas. However, and drawing a parallel to national public policy processes (Dye, 2013), the conception of a problem of public relevance does not necessarily imply that all states interpret it in the same way and, often, that they agree on the very existence of a common problem (Kaul et al., 1999). In other words, there is no single global agenda for international cooperation. There are only guiding or “aspirational” initiatives such as Agenda 21 (1992), Millennium Agenda (2000), and Agenda 2030 (2015), which constitute a sketch of what would be an integrated effort of collective action.

If the contours and framings of global problems are subject to different interpretations and interests of the participating states, one cannot assume that there is only one solution or a narrow set of solutions to global problems. Moreover, it is also unreasonable to assume that states are the only relevant actors in shaping interests in negotiations of issues on the contemporary international agenda (Green, 2013). Although trustees of much of international agreements, international organizations also have their own interests and considerable influence on the formation of international agendas and decision-making processes (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). In addition, the participation of non-state actors has been growing in international decision-making processes, especially several civil society or hybrid actors (Green, 2013; Frémaux, 2017; Orliange and Zaratiegui, 2022), as well as the private sector itself (OECD, 2023a).

All the aforementioned considerations are part of a general collective understanding of what “international cooperation” would be in terms of the possibilities and potentials for effective agreements among stakeholders on a public problem of global relevance and impacts. International cooperation would essentially be the field aimed at studying the political processes of conforming interests and the shaping global policies and guidelines in response to collective or common problems (Ocampo, 2016). However, and resorting again to an analogy with the national public policy decision-making process, what happens when states effectively agree on a set of problems (agenda-setting) and formulate a global response strategy, containing several possible solutions to its causes or to mitigate its negative consequences? In other words, how do states and other stakeholders coordinate to effectively implement the international commitments they have undertaken?

Bringing back the idea of openness, the implementation aspect of international cooperation is less understood by the Brazilian public policy operators and, particularly, by the general public in Brazil. In fact, the debate about public policy implementation is already reasonably complex at the domestic level (Lindblom, 1959; Pressman and Wildawski, 1984; Wilson, 1989; March, 1994; Kingdon, 1995; Lipsky, 2010), and even more challenging when the linkages between global problems and national realities are included (Stone, 2004; 2008). In essence, when implementing international commitments, international cooperation fundamentally becomes a link between the international commitment and national public policies, as a two-way path. Perhaps the most “practical” aspect of the relationship between international cooperation and its effective implementation materialized in projects and programs is noticeable when it is underpinned by a set of aspirational goals and objectives that, in effect, materialize solutions to internationally relevant collective problems (Finnemore and Jurkovich, 2020).

This was the case of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), stemming from the United Nations Millennium Agenda, as well as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which contains seventeen goals and one hundred and sixty-nine objectives that provide guidance for implementing a network of diverse actions in all countries. In this context, official international cooperation would emerge as a practical instance of coordination of official projects and resources offered by developed (Official Development Assistance – ODA) and developing countries (South-South Cooperation for Development – SSCD) for the direct or shared implementation of programs, projects and actions in developing countries. In other words, cooperation between countries would be primarily aimed at implementing the development agenda with an international scope, in short: International Development Cooperation (IDC).

The case of Brazilian international development cooperation in the context of the Millennium and the 2030 Agendas is quite peculiar, either because of the growing role of SSCD since the 2000s or due to Brazil’s ambivalent character in relation to IDC (Baumann and Schleicher, 2023). Consequently, this paper focuses on the official Brazil’s IDC. By “Brazilian IDC Abroad”, we take the criteria employed by the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada – Ipea) in the Brazilian International Development Cooperation (Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional – Cobradi) 2021 Report (Ipea, 2022b). In this report, cooperation “abroad” encompasses four frameworks : i) bilateral SSCD; ii) trilateral SSCD; iii) contributions to global governance structures (compulsory and voluntary); and iv) horizontal partnerships between Brazil and developed countries that cannot be characterized as IDC “offered from abroad” to Brazil. In such cases,

and in the absence of concepts to explain such frameworks, the term “South-North cooperation” is also employed interchangeably (Ipea, 2022b).

Unlike much of the knowledge produced on Brazilian SSC in recent decades, which is based on perception of government officials/official statements and case studies (Schleicher, Miranda and Franco, 2022), this paper analyzes primary data from the Brazilian IDC and looks for behavioral patterns of Brazil on this topic. Given the scope limitations, this paper does not explore the conjectures or hypotheses that explain the regularities found. The method employed for the analysis privileges descriptive statistics, which can enlighten explanatory questions for future research.

Drawing on data from the Cobradi research that has been gathered by Ipea since 2010 and from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD), the article identifies four regularities of Brazilian IDC abroad since 2005. The second section illustrates the trend of over-representation, a phenomenon related to Brazil’s high contribution to international institutions on the one hand, and on the other, the lack of analysis on the real external benefits associated with the expenditure and the possible losses from overlapping mandates among the various organizations in which Brazil operates. The third section discusses the contradictions and the ambivalence that are inherent to Brazil’s role as recipient and provider of IDC, as well as the possible impacts on Brazil’s foreign discourse.

The fourth section illustrates, albeit incipiently due to the novelty of the data resulting from the Cobradi 2021 research, the phenomenon of internal decentralization of international cooperation initiatives between public institutions and federative entities, as well as its positive and negative effects on Brazil’s international cooperation. The fifth section points out the (in)ability of national and subnational actors in Brazil to articulate themselves beyond the pragmatic interests of sectoral public policies, characterizing an instrumentalism in the management and implementation of Brazil’s IDC initiatives. The sixth and final section briefly discusses the implications of the four characteristics for Brazil’s international insertion and Brazilian foreign policy.

It is also worth pointing out a distinction in the relationship between Brazil’s IDC and the 2030 Agenda. Like all the other countries that have joined the global development pact, Brazil has national responsibilities for achieving the main Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), understood as progress on the one hundred and sixty-nine goals associated with them. However, the relationship between the Brazilian IDC and the 2030 Agenda discussed in this paper is not related to Brazil’s internal efforts to meet the goals, but to the Brazilian external initiatives to promote the 2030 Agenda among Brazil’s partner countries and institutions.


2 OVER-REPRESENTATION

The Brazilian preference for multilateralism is an enduring characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy, which was intensified in the first decade of the 2000s (Amorim, 2010; 2011), and had significant impacts on Brazil's international insertion both in that decade and in subsequent years. According to international relations theories explain, countries that are not great powers would need to bet on multilateralism to ensure the pursuit of their interests (Ruggie, 1992). Considering this option and the fact that most international institutions have their work directly connected to the global development agenda, it would also be reasonable to assume that the implementation of Brazilian initiatives in the field of international development cooperation is articulated within the scope of those institutions.

Indeed, the misunderstanding discussed in the opening section on the two perspectives of international cooperation is best illustrated here. To a large extent, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (Ministério das Relações Exteriores – MRE) publicly justify the mandatory expenditures and capital contributions to international institutions from the perspective of the operation of Brazilian foreign policy goals: Brazil's vote and participation in these institutions are linked to the payment of mandatory quotas/contributions. However, and from the international development perspective, those same international institutions coordinate and/or implement part of international and regional development commitments, besides the fact that they are crucial to operationalizing Brazil's two strands of cooperation, “abroad” and “offered from abroad” (Ipea and ABC, 2010; 2013; 2017; 2018; 2020; Ipea, 2022a; 2022b).

The time series in Figure 1 illustrates the importance of such institutions for implementing Brazilian cooperation “abroad”. The figure displays the time series of the proportion of Brazilian contributions to international institutions in relation to total annual expenditures on IDC. There are two trends in the time series that are clearly noticeable. The first is the average proportion of almost 68% of the total Brazilian spending on IDC to international institutions between 2005 and 2021, which includes compulsory and voluntary contributions, as well as capital contributions to International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

FIGURE 1
Share of the Brazilian IDC's contributions to international organizations in relation to total expenditure (2005-2021)
 (In %)



Source: Ipea and ABC (2010; 2013; 2017; 2020); Ipea (2022a; 2022b).

Obs.: The figure does not include the capital integralization to the New Development Bank (NDB), amounting to R\$ 3.452 billion in 2021.

The second trend is the inconstancy of the disbursements to effectively fulfill the commitments resulting from Brazilian membership in several international institutions. Knowing that a large part of the mandatory contributions is annual, repetitive in nature, little variation in the percentage related to annual contributions would be expected. However, the wide range between the lowest value (25.39% in 2015) and the third highest value (87.26% in 2017) reaches almost 62 percentage points. And, even considering that atypical expenditures in other cooperation modalities may have occurred in specific years of the time series, a range of this nature clearly points to delays in fulfilling Brazil's international commitments. This is a situation in which high contribution percentages in a specific year may indicate the execution of arrears related to previous years. The case of the NDB in 2021 is illustrative of this phenomenon (Ipea, 2022a).

Finally, it is important to mention that 2019 and 2020 cannot be considered typical years for any analysis of the Brazilian IDC, due to the effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic. The 2019-2020 Cobradi research was implemented in an exclusively virtual format, a circumstance that created difficulties for data collection and establishing contacts with the participating institutions. In addition, and exclusively for the year 2020, a very high proportion in contributions to international institutions would effectively be expected, given that most Brazilian cooperation initiatives were postponed or canceled. Indeed, the Cobradi 2019-2020 has presented solid evidence on the impact of the Pandemic as the

main hypothesis to explain the 41% drop in Brazilian expenditures on IDC in the 2019-2020 biennium, according to data from a supplementary research on the effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic on the Brazilian IDC (Ipea, 2022a).

After observing the enormous relative importance of the contributions to multilateral organizations with regard to the total expenditure of the Brazilian IDC since 2005, it is essential to disaggregate such expenditures. For this, possibly the data from the Cobradi 2021 research would be the most complete, since the 2021 research inaugurated a series of methodological improvements resulting from international understandings made by Brazil to the OECD and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Schleicher and Barros, 2022). Furthermore, the percentage relative to contributions in 2021 presents little deviation regarding the average proportion of the 2005-2021 series shown in Figure 1 above, indicating that the year 2021 is close to what would be expected for a typical proportion for this modality of contributions to international institutions. Table 1 brings a series of relevant information for the discussion on the over-representation proposed in this section. It is important to note that Table 1 below does not include the amount of the capital payment to the NDB in 2021. In statistics, this disbursement is an outlier, reason why Figure 1 does not include this observation for the analysis of the proportion of contributions.³

Table 1 shows a distinction between mandatory contributions to other institutions (sub-item B01), mandatory contributions to multilateral institutions (B02a), voluntary contributions to multilateral institutions (B02b) and contributions for specific use (B03). The former Ministry of Economy, via its Secretariat for International Economic Affairs (Secretaria de Assuntos Internacionais – Sain) was the main responsible for the disbursement of Brazil's forty-seven mandatory contributions, reaching a total amount of R\$ 5.5 billion in 2021. Interestingly, the Ministry of Economy was also responsible for 85 of the 166 voluntary contributions to international institutions, for the benefit of several Brazilian federal institutions (Ipea, 2022b). Finally, it is impossible not to notice the number of miscellaneous contributions paid directly by dozens of federal institutions, although they are smaller than the mandatory contributions, which reinforces the argument about the relevance of international institutions (in a broad sense) for the implementation of the Brazilian IDC.

3. As a curiosity, the proportion shown for 2021 in Figure 1 would reach 83.21% if the payment of Brazilian capital to the NBD were considered. A delay of this amount is unprecedented in the time series of contributions to international institutions, computed by Cobradi since 2005.

TABLE 1
Contributions to international institutions (2021)

Modality and subitem of international cooperation	Total (R\$)	Number of initiatives
B – Financial contributions to programs and funds	5.728.731.833,57	231
B01 – Mandatory contributions to NGOs, research centers, PPPs and other private entities	2.336.958,33	3
Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira	2.336.958,33	3
B02a – Mandatory contributions to multilateral institutions	5.519.825.683,83	52
Defensoria Pública da União	37.004,84	3
Ministério da Economia	5.517.609.549,45	47
Ministério do Turismo	2.179.129,54	2
B02b – Voluntary contributions to multilateral institutions	47.656.458,39	166
Agência Nacional de Cinema	990.296,00	1
Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações	109.146,40	1
Agência Nacional de Transportes Aquaviários	11.651,75	1
Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres	16.128,52	1
Banco Central do Brasil	1.625.233,68	4
Comando da Aeronáutica	402.262,76	4
Comando da Marinha	111.370,30	1
Comissão de Valores Mobiliários	77.253,18	1
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica	391.932,16	1
Instituto Federal da Paraíba	8.315,00	1
Instituto Nacional de Metrologia, Qualidade e Tecnologia	37.300,00	1
Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social	374.718,20	2
Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento	341.825,11	1
Ministério da Cidadania	45.836,71	1
Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação	209.957,44	5
Ministério da Economia	37.951.966,87	85
Ministério da Educação	67.134,60	1
Ministério da Infraestrutura	181.792,83	3
Ministério da Justiça e da Segurança Pública	73.099,74	1
Ministério das Comunicações	83.503,07	1
Ministério de Minas e Energia	36.665,75	1
Ministério de Relações Exteriores	1.929.313,06	1
Ministério do Trabalho	767.046,91	6
Ministério do Turismo	972.601,00	5
Superintendência de Seguros Privados	511.932,75	4
Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira	8.670,00	1

(Continues)

(Continued)

Modality and subitem of international cooperation	Total (R\$)	Number of initiatives
Universidade Federal da Bahia	2.023,45	2
Universidade Federal da Integração Latino-Americana	11.051,05	2
Universidade Federal da Paraíba	24.618,75	4
Universidade Federal de Ciências da Saúde de Porto Alegre	23.349,95	3
Universidade Federal de Goiás	70.676,15	4
Universidade Federal de Itajubá	10.289,50	1
Universidade Federal de Roraima	13.291,88	2
Universidade Federal do ABC	1.904,29	1
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro	79.279,43	6
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande	18.301,77	2
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul	64.718,38	4
B03 – Earmarked contributions to projects, programs, funds and institutions	158.912.733,02	10
Agência Nacional de Cinema	69.086,85	1
Centro Nacional de Monitoramento e Alertas de Desastres Naturais	-	2
Defensoria Pública da União	30.558,29	3
Ministério da Economia	141.090.199,88	1
Ministério da Saúde	17.719.798,00	2
Ministério de Minas e Energia	3.090,00	1
Grand total	5.728.731.833,57	231

Source: Ipea (2022b).

When observing the relative importance of the Brazilian expenditures on international institutions since 2005, it is fair to speculate about their impact. From a foreign policy perspective, what would be the relationship between the expenditures to maintain these structures and the Brazilian international interests? As in the case of domestic sectoral public policies, are such criteria transparent and susceptible to evaluation? Would it be necessary to analyze the internal dynamics in partner international organizations to understand their relation with the realization of Brazil's foreign policy objectives? If not, which indicators could be used to evaluate Brazilian foreign policy in order to understand the effectiveness of the expenditures? With regard to sectorial national public policies, what criteria could be used to evaluate the impacts' of Brazil's technical participation in fora to which the country has contributed?

Such data would be crucial to discuss the rationality of maintaining certain international formal support structures. Another necessary debate concerns the level of redundancy in maintaining international institutions with reasonably similar mandates. Finally, in the age of digital transformation, in which meetings,

debates, and diplomacy are resorting to virtual environments, does it make sense to discuss alternatives to formal structures in international technical institutions? Certainly, the mobility restrictions brought about by the potential for rationalizing traditional participation costs associated with the ministries of foreign affairs around the world, not to mention the benefits associated with reduced security risks for heads of state and other high-ranking country representatives. In a similar vein, it makes sense to consider in the debate the maintenance of Brazil's official contributions to various institutions whose mandates are identical and in essence revolve around the resolution of the same global and/or regional problems.

Although the analysis of the expenditures from a foreign policy perspective raises more questions than answers, it is conceivable to assume that a focus on implementation may provide a clearer understanding of how institutional structures support Brazil's international development cooperation initiatives. It is not rare, for example, to find Brazilian SSC initiatives in the triangular format, an arrangement in which international institutions prove to be essential for the implementation of Brazilian projects, allowing for the exchange of practices and knowledge between Brazil and its partners. In addition, and as will be discussed in the next section, it is important to note that Brazil is still a country with enormous internal public policy challenges, such as the monitoring and evaluation of domestic public policies. Cooperation between Brazil and international institutions operating in its territory is an important alternative framework for the implementation of local development initiatives, since international institutions are also channel through which cooperation offered from abroad flows to Brazil.

3 AMBIVALENCE

Brazil's recent history reveals that it has moved very quickly from being a recipient of external practices, knowledge, and technologies to a provider of such experiences abroad, particularly to the countries of the global South (Schleicher, Miranda and Franco, 2022; Schleicher and Barros-Plataiu, 2017). This shift has occurred on a larger scale since the new millennium and has not come without contradictions, particularly because Brazil has become both a provider and a recipient of IDC. On the one hand, Brazil keeps receiving contributions from abroad, pointing to the prevalence of donors' interests despite global normative attempts to introduce graduation practices and prioritize cooperation with less developed countries. On the other hand, though Brazil, as a developing country, has no formal obligations to spend on IDC initiatives, but due to the active participation in various multilateral forums, the country would certainly have a reputational obligation to contribute to global development challenges, currently guided by the 2030 SDGs.


In addition to the aforementioned contributions, Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation initiatives are, par excellence, the expression of the country's interest to contribute to overcoming the development challenges of its partners, which are guided by the principles of South-South cooperation. Although it is argued that Brazil, being an upper-middle income developing country, may not be in a position to receive IDC, it is even clearer the ambivalence between the discourse of solidarity of SSC and the effective practice of cooperation in several sectors. The case of educational and scientific cooperation, for example, is emblematic of this ambivalence. Brazil promotes mobility by attracting students from the South to its higher education public system, but almost all the official resources from the mobility of Brazilian students is oriented to a few developed countries, as will be discussed later.

Data from the Cobradi's time series of the Cobradi research that has been regularly conducted by Ipea since 2005 show that Brazil makes a substantial contribution to the international development agenda. Figure 2 displays two-time series built from two datasets, which differ essentially in the amounts (light blue line in Figure 2 below). Since 2005, the Cobradi research estimated the volume of the Brazilian expenditures by year, biennium or triennium, accumulating nominal values that constituted the historical series. Despite the fact that during the 2005-2016 period the Cobradi research went through several methodological adjustments, it was only in the 2017-2018 research that Ipea effectively included the analysis of budgetary data in a rigorous format, in an unprecedented partnership with the Federal Budget Secretariat, of the former Ministry of Budget and Planning. In addition to the precise analysis of the amounts spent on IDC by the federal government, Ipea also estimated the expenditures of previous periods until 2005.

Observing the difference in the two series, it is reasonable to argue that the values of the Brazilian expenditures and transfers to international institutions were either underestimated in the 2010-2016 Cobradi reports or were only made available for effective calculation in later periods. As already discussed, the wide variations in the share of contributions to international institutions can arise from delays in Brazilian transfers, from delays in access to data or by the presence of outliers. Regardless of what the explanation is, the 2017-2018 Cobradi research presented a more accurate landscape, both in terms of the origin of the data and the significance of the absolute values. Yet, those factors alone are insufficient to explain the significant peak in spending shown in Figure 2. A third hypothesis consistent with the growth in this particular period is the inclusion of the *Science without Borders* (SwB) program expenditures in the suggested revision by the Cobradi 2017-2018. The program was in force from 2011-2016, when about R\$ 13 billion (about R\$ 16.7 billion/US\$ 3.09 billion in 2021 current values)

were spent on scholarships paid to Brazilians university students for international academic mobility to a short list of developed countries, subsequently including China and India in the list. In SwB, Brazil unarguably moved away from the South-South cooperation patterns.

FIGURE 2
Brazilian expenditures with IDC (2005-2021)




Source: Ipea and ABC (2020); Ipea (2022b).

Obs.: Brazilian expenditure with IDC in current values of 2021. Nominal annual expenditure deflator: Extended National Consumer Price Index (Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo – IPCA).

Observing the continuous line in the time series in Figure 2, there are two trends that need to be discussed. The first is the huge growth in expenditures in the period 2011-2015. As discussed earlier, the two most plausible hypotheses to explain the growth in these years according to the federal public budget are: i) delayed payments of contributions to international institutions; and ii) high expenditures with the SwB program, which coincides with this period. The second trend is a 285% increase in the volume of spending from 2020 to 2021. Considering that both years were strongly influenced by the Covid-19 Pandemic, it can be said that the pandemic alone would not be a sufficient variable to explain the growth in spending. Similarly, and as commented in the previous section, even if one excludes Brazil's huge contribution to the NDB, the 2021 figure is still 87% higher than those of 2020 and 7% higher than the expenditures of 2019, the year before the pandemic. As such, the only variable that seems to explain the apparent increase in spending is the methodological improvement of the Cobradi research that Ipea implemented for the 2021 year, which meant greater precision in capturing expenditures as well as the expansion of the target population, mostly among the institutions from the federal government.

If the time series of the Cobradi research now has a more complete account of Brazilian expenditures on IDC, and given that Brazil is still internationally seen as a developing country, any curious observer would naturally ask: is Brazil a provider or a recipient of IDC? Or even: when Brazil expands its expenditures with IDC abroad, are the main recipients developing countries? Figure 3 shows a comparison between the time series of Cobradi and the net ODA received by Brazil, which still points to an ambivalence of the Brazilian role in the international development agenda, particularly after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda. However, the comparison between the linear averages reveals that the annual average Brazilian expenditure on IDC (US\$ 681 million) exceeds by 15.37% the average expenditure of net ODA received by Brazil in the period 2005-2020 (US\$ 590 million). It is important to note that ODA and the cooperation from Brazil to abroad captured by Cobradi are close, but not identical measures.

FIGURE 3
Net official development assistance to Brazil versus Brazilian expenditures in IDC (2005-2020)




Source: DAC/OECD; Ipea and ABC (2020); Ipea (2022b).

Obs.: ODA and Brazilian expenditures on IDC in 2020 current values. Nominal annual expenditure deflator: IPCA.

An additional question worth exploring is the weight of net ODA received by Brazil in relation to the same assistance allocated to other Latin American and Caribbean countries. Considering the size of the development agenda in Brazil and its condition as an ODA recipient, it would be expected that the country would have a considerable participation in the region. However, this is not the trend indicated by the data on the distribution of Brazil's percentage share of ODA in the region. In fact, Brazil's average percentage share of net ODA to Latin America and the Caribbean between 2005 and 2020 was only 6.42%. Highlighting again the ambivalence of Brazil's role in the development agenda:

the years in which the proportion of net ODA received by Brazil exceeded 8% of the total allocated to the region were exactly those in which Brazil spent the most IDC (2011-2015). Given such a trend, the analysis of private flows may be key to understanding the role of Brazil as an IDC recipient.

FIGURE 4
Brazil's share in net official development assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean (2005-2020)




Source: DAC/OECD.

If we can already discuss the ambivalence of Brazil's role in the IDC agenda from the Cobradi aggregated data, its contours are even clearer in the specific modalities of international cooperation. Unlike the previous Cobradi reports, the 2021 report brought a thematic analysis of Brazil's educational and scientific international cooperation. Among the themes covered by the survey, international student and academic mobility funded by Brazil gained special prominence, and it is possible to note a feature that has been discussed by the specialized literature: a contradiction between the discourse and the practice of internationalization of the Brazilian higher education (Guilherme, Morosini and Santos, 2018).

On the one hand, the Brazilian discourse emphasizes the solidarity and horizontality that are typical of the relationship between the countries of the Global South. On the other, the practice demonstrates that Brazilian outbound mobility is concentrated in a few developed countries, while inbound mobility to Brazil is essentially composed of countries from the global South. Mostly relying on data from the three main public institutions that promote official student and academic mobility: Higher Education Personnel Improvement Coordination (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Capes); National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico – CNPq); and Research Support

Foundation of the State of São Paulo (Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo – Fapesp), Figure 5 illustrates a high degree of concentration of mobility expenditures in just two countries in the year 2021. Besides, all the top twenty destination countries for Brazilians in 2021 were developed countries.


FIGURE 5

Top 20 destinations for Brazilian student and academic mobility (2021)

Source: Ipea (2022b).

Likewise, and according to the Figure 6 we note a tendency diametrically opposed to the one observed in the “outbound” mobility in Figure 5. Among the twenty countries that concentrated most of the Brazilian expenditures, there are only developing countries. However, Figure 6 still needs to be interpreted with caution, since it only includes students from Undergraduate Agreement Student Program (Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Graduação – PEC-G), Graduate Agreement Student Program (Programa de Estudantes-Convênio de Pós-Graduação – PEC-PG), Institutional Internationalization Program (Programa Institucional de Internacionalização – PrInt), and also those regularly enrolled in education programs at the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fundação Oswaldo Cruz – Fiocruz). It is only possible to discuss whether the trend of “inward” mobility is effectively concentrated primarily on students and researchers from developing countries after an in-depth analysis of the data displayed of other foreign students in Brazil, including indirect public expenses made with students that receive and do not receive Brazilian grants.

FIGURE 6
Top 20 student and academic mobility to Brazil (2021)



Source: Ipea (2022b).

The analysis of the data displayed in Figure 6 inevitably leads to the conclusion that the Brazilian profile needs to be better analyzed and problematized by the specialized literature. Inoue and Vaz (2012) have shown that Brazil played a growing role as a “donor of the South” in the 2010's, with new developments and tensions arising from its status as a developing country and a promoter of South-South cooperation. In this sense, the ambivalence highlighted here may also point to a larger debate on the power shifts at the international level, as many middle-income countries begin to compete with traditional donors from the North in the IDC (Orliange and Barros-Plataiu, 2020).

4 DECENTRALIZATION

Although the system for coordinating the Brazilian International Technical Cooperation emerged in the mid-1950s, with a strong focus on the international cooperation offered from abroad and technology transfer from developed countries, it was only with Decree No. 94.973/87 that the Brazilian MRE effectively structured the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação – ABC). ABC's main attributions include the formal supervision of Brazilian international cooperation initiatives both “offered from abroad” and “abroad”, in any policy 20rea area. ABC is particularly active throughout SSCD project cycles and in international cooperation initiatives offered from abroad in the “national implementation” framework (Decree No. 5.151/04). With the

enactment of Decree No. 9683/19, the ABC also gained protagonism in the humanitarian cooperation agenda, mainly in the coordination of its activities.

However, there are other units within the MRE that have competing mandates with the ABC. The case of the educational division is emblematic, given the importance of educational and scientific cooperation for Brazil's international development agenda (Ipea, 2022b). Themes such as student and international academic mobility, Brazil's international scientific, research and innovation networks, for example, are topics that are at the top of the development agenda and of international debates on quantification and measurement, but are treated separately by the MRE itself.

Such a decision of pulverizing the mandate for the international development agenda in the ministry is not unusual when one considers the richness, diversity, and plurality of the federal actors that offer and receive international development cooperation. Table 2 shows that the federal higher education system alone accounted for 89.45% of Brazil's international development cooperation initiatives in the year 2021. The initiatives listed under code 51000 include expenditures executed directly by the Federal Institutes of Higher Education (Institutos Federais de Ensino Superior – IFES) as well as by the three largest public funding agencies in Brazil (Capes, CNPq and Fapesp). If we exclude the initiatives undertaken by multilateral organizations, which essentially refer to contributions, the value of Brazil's educational and scientific cooperation would reach about 39% of the expenditures in 2021, a percentage considerably higher than the 31% of international technical cooperation represented by the federal government's expenditure (11001) in modalities C and D below.

TABLE 2
Channels of implementation by modality of the Brazilian IDC (2021)

Channels of implementation and modality	Total (R\$)	Total (%)	Number of initiatives
11001 – Federal government	549.225.217,16	8.28	631
B – Financial contributions to programs and funds	4.690.943,40	0.07	14
C – Projects	1.351.455,46	0.02	15
D – Technical cooperation	286.037.663,80	4.31	293
E – Scholarships and student-related expenses	5.861.333,52	0.09	75
G – Administrative costs	25.719.336,28	0.39	7
I – Support to refugees, asylum-seekers, protected persons	100.592.643,07	1.52	2
J – In-Kind donations	124.971.841,63	1.88	225
11002 – State-Level government	2.202.961,27	0.03	3
C – Projects	600.000,00	0.01	1
D – Technical cooperation	1.602.961,27	0.02	2

(Continues)

(Continued)

Channels of implementation and modality	Total (R\$)	Total (%)	Number of initiatives
11004 – Local-Level government	1.892.960,08	0.03	4
D – Technical cooperation	1.771.827,43	0.03	2
G – Administrative costs	121.132,65	0.00	1
K – Research and development	-	0.00	1
20000 – NGOs and civil society	1.283,52	0.00	2
D – Technical cooperation	1.283,52	0.00	1
E – Scholarships and student-related expenses	-	0.00	1
30000 – Public-private partnerships and networks	5.200.288,48	0.08	4
J – In-Kind donations	4.120.288,48	0.06	3
K – Research and development	1.080.000,00	0.02	1
40000 – Multilateral organizations	5.722.205.442,33	86.26	183
B – Financial contributions to programs and funds	5.722.060.602,07	86.26	181
D – Technical cooperation	144.840,26	0.00	1
E – Scholarships and student-related expenses	-	0.00	1
51000 – Teaching or research institutions	352.260.572,45	5.31	7045
B – Financial contributions to programs and funds	1.911.201,25	0.03	35
D – Technical cooperation	613.712,00	0.01	5
E – Scholarships and student-related expenses	292.372.880,50	4.41	6344
K – Research and development	57.362.778,70	0.86	661
60000 – Private sector institutions	567.357,65	0.01	2
B – Financial contributions to programs and funds	69.086,85	0.00	1
D – Technical cooperation	498.270,80	0.01	1
Grand total	6.633.556.082,94	100.00	7874

Source: Ipea (2022b).

The debate on the role of educational and scientific cooperation is only one aspect of a trend towards institutional decentralization in IDC in Brazil. The efforts of Ipea, ABC and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE) to bring together the Cobradi methodology and international statistical standards – such as Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) and the methodology for quantifying SSCD – developed under the auspices of UNCTAD – demands greater detailing of international cooperation initiatives in a context of a broad discussion on the international development agenda (Schleicher and Barros, 2022). Table 2 presents a considerable advance with regard to the implementation channels of international cooperation initiatives and what would be the most typical modalities promoted by these actors. In addition to the methodological improvements that have progressively allowed for a better analysis of the decentralization trend among the federative entities, it also points to an additional aspect of diversification of actors and cooperation initiatives (Ipea, 2022b).

There is another issue brought up by the Cobradi 2021 research that demands further discussion on the relationship between decentralization aspects and ambivalence: it is possible that a large part of the cooperation offered from abroad to Brazil is destined for projects that are directly executed in states, cities, or in favor of other segments of civil society, universities, and research centers. Notwithstanding, it is not possible to dig deeper into the plausibility of this hypothesis given the current scarcity of data on decentralized IDC in Brazil.

As seen in the Cobradi 2021 research, that includes the participation of the subnational entities, the Brazilian federal government is so far the main responsible for the financing of Brazil's official South-South cooperation (Ipea, 2022b). Even in the case of implementation of SSCD, the federal government is the third largest channel in terms of expenditures and the second in terms of volume of initiatives, based on the data displayed in Table 2. It would not be surprising that further research on Brazil's cooperation "for abroad" reinforces global trends of direct cooperation between subnational entities and points to important partnership networks and initiatives between Brazilian and foreign cities, as it is already happening in other continents (OECD, 2023b). Likewise, it is also necessary to evaluate in depth the characteristics of ODA and other financial flows allocated to Brazil. In so doing, these actions will be more aligned with national development priorities and, undoubtedly, with the challenges materialized in the 2030 Agenda. More research is needed to shed light on the relation between international cooperation projects offered from abroad and the local dynamics of democracy, such as the impacts of such projects on voter's choices in Brazilian states and municipalities. Given the scenario of decentralization, the next section discusses the possibilities of integrated management of initiatives and actors for the Brazilian IDC, drawing from the SDGs and their goals.

5 INSTRUMENTALISM

The analysis of the data on ODA and SSCD in the previous sections raises a fundamental structural issue: the endurance of dual thinking in the global development agenda. Similarly, and due to Brazil's cooperation experience, it is common to incorporate this binary structure in the characterization of the Brazilian international cooperation, based on the idea of cooperation "abroad" (SSCD) and "offered from abroad" (North-South). However, this pedestrian binary structure is not able to grasp the managerial challenges proposed by the 2030 Agenda and, to a large extent, integrate efforts ranging from optimizing the provision of global public goods to discussions on strategies to ensure equity and rights among peoples.

The challenges embodied in the SDGs prompt both the active search for broader management arrangements that ensure an integrated development agenda and the creation of bridges between dialectic worldviews, built under a binary “us” and “them” discourse. Challenges such as climate change and the Covid-19 Pandemic, for example, illustrate that it is necessary for the age of the Anthropocene to expand horizons beyond the “instrumental rationality”, in Horkheimer’s (2012) sense.

The most recent data on Brazil’s IDC clearly point to a potential for expanding approaches that overcome the duality for/from and the instrumentalism in the management of IDC. Although the concept of capacity development endures, to a large extent as a synonym for international cooperation, Brazil’s international technical cooperation is only one among several modalities. Brazil’s educational and scientific cooperation already figures prominently in Brazil’s international development agenda (Ipea, 2022b), strengthening even more the argument that a network-based logic would be more fruitful to understand Brazil’s participation in IDC. In fact, approaching regularities, dynamics, and adaptations in terms of open systems and international cooperation networks is not a new approach. Neither is the philosophical basis of complex systems thinking, which dates back to the late 1940s.

Warren Weaver’s (1948) text, entitled *Science and Complexity*, is perhaps the clearest framework for overcoming the ample and indiscriminate use of frequency statistics as the central method for accumulating knowledge. Weaver argues for the need to develop other analytical methods to explain phenomena which contain a large number of explanatory variables, but do not have a totally random behavior and are grouped together to form a discernible whole. In other words, an “organized complexity”.

According to the author, science would have gone through two stages in its contemporary debate on the scientific method. The first, which was predominant until the end of the 19th century, was based on the simplification of problems as interaction between two variables. In the following century, science moved towards thinking in terms of an incredibly large number of variables that could explain a phenomenon of interest. However, such explanations depended on some contextual conditions, which were mainly linked to the random behavior of the units of analysis. Weaver called those problems “disorganized complexities”. In such cases, the inclusion of multiple variables, the counting of frequencies and the use of averages as the parameter for analysis were central characteristics.

Most phenomena in the social sciences can be understood as problems consisting of a fair number of interrelated variables whose behavior is not random, but organically interrelated. In this sense, the concept popularized as “The Edge of Chaos”, presupposes that various social systems develop in a partially disorganized

and adaptive way, and exhibit a “whole” that is considerably larger than its “parts”, a characteristic called “emergence”. In other words, the relationships between the parts constitute an open and adaptive system, stimulating creativity and innovation. In such organized complexities, small changes in a few variables can generate disproportionately large effects in many variables, due to the characteristics of each system.

Thinking in terms of open and adaptive systems seems aligned both with the idea of capacity building that guides the international technical cooperation for/from Brazil and with basically all topics on Brazil’s educational and scientific cooperation agenda, which includes issues such as the collaborative production of scientific knowledge, the mobility of ideas and people, the formation of innovation networks, and evolutionary strategies aimed at different forms of teaching-learning. In other words, at least two of the three most important modalities of Brazil’s international development cooperation have directly benefited from overcoming the linear and binary thinking towards a systems- or network-based strategy.

In fact, the practical effects of instrumental rational thinking in the management of international cooperation are the creation of incentives for each public policy area to build its own niches, contributing to the absence of an integrated perspective of Brazilian participation in the international development agenda. In these terms, the incorporations of various “diplomacies” in Brazil is a clear example of this tendency to think of Brazilian IDC instrumentally: innovation diplomacy, education diplomacy, health diplomacy, science diplomacy, ethanol diplomacy, among others. Furthermore, it is also necessary to place Brazil’s development cooperation in the context of multiple national partnerships, involving articulations at the three levels of the Brazilian federation and in different sectors. In this sense, it is valid to ask: who is responsible for managing the synergies between the thematic areas of the Brazilian public policies in favor of an integrated international development agenda? Is it possible to think of Brazil’s international development cooperation as something other than a mere “foreign policy instrument”? (Amorim, 2010; 2011).

The Cobradi 2021 research brought the largest number of participating institutions for the first time in its history, including institutions from the states of the Federation. The expansion of the population of interest in the research and the aforementioned process of methodological improvement carried out by Ipea contributed to the analysis of the Brazilian IDC through its connections with the seventeen SDGs and their goals. Table 3 shows an unusual characterization of Brazilian expenditures and initiatives on IDC. In terms of expenditures, the greatest innovation is to visualize how contributions to international institutions are related to the promotion of each SDG abroad, given the connection between

the Brazilian contribution and the specific mandates of certain international organizations (e.g. SDG9).


TABLE 3
Brazilian IDC expenditure and initiatives, by SDGs (2021)

SDG	Total (R\$)	Number of initiatives
SDG1	10.316.278,27	7
SDG2	187.454.196,44	41
SDG3	356.741.259,36	260
SDG4	374.553.427,17	6443
SDG5	301.055,10	4
SDG6	1.765.710,93	4
SDG7	1.759.298,81	5
SDG8	343.462.483,38	71
SDG9	3.993.914.260,65	677
SDG10	106.948.547,43	8
SDG11	18.426.465,74	15
SDG12	2.110.486,30	3
SDG13	3.992.766,05	7
SDG14	6.146.117,92	11
SDG15	9.214.564,92	12
SDG16	264.890.544,87	197
SDG17	951.558.619,62	109
Total	6.633.556.082,94	7874

Source: Ipea (2022b).

It is equally insightful to visualize the data contained in Table 3, further highlighted in Figure. The figure points to the existence of three groupings of SDGs in the Brazilian IDC in 2021, a fact that is not unexpected provided that the three groups of SDGs have similar themes. The first one refers to the themes of poverty, education and health, with a combined expenditure of R\$ 919 million. The second contains the themes of economic growth, infrastructure, and inequality, representing a combined expenditure of R\$ 992 million. Finally, the third group synthesizes the issues of institutional strengthening, justice, and global partnership, with the largest expenditure among the three groups, representing R\$ 1.216 billion.

FIGURE 7
Brazilian IDC expenditure, by SDG (2021)



Source: Ipea (2022b).


Obs.: Does not include the capital integralization to the NDB, in the amount of R\$ 3.452 billion.

Even more instigating than the synergies among SDGs emanating from the distribution of expenditures, is the social network analysis of the institutions participating in the Brazilian IDC in 2021, which reveals a real path for the management of the Brazilian international development cooperation based on an open/adaptative systems logic. Figure 1 shows a visualization of IDC management based on the expenditures by SDGs, making a rupture with typical sectoral particularisms in favor of a common metric for domestic and foreign public policy operators. The total expenditure represents the size of the circle in each SDG, and the SDGs become “nodes” that connect the institutions responsible for the initiatives. In addition, it is also possible to manage synergies between the efforts of national institutions by looking at their contributions to specific SDGs or even the cross effects of their activities for multiple SDGs. In sum, Figure 8 consists essentially of the list of institutions responsible for the Brazilian IDC in 2021 based on their expenditures in each SDG. The size of each SDG corresponds directly to the volume of Brazilian expenditures in its favor.

Finally, and to reinforce the argument in favor of overcoming the instrumental rationality in the management of the Brazilian IDC, the option to consider an open/adaptative systems logic based on SDGs – or any other metric – naturally breaks with the uninspired and persistent dualism between cooperation provided to (“abroad”) and received from (“offered from abroad”) Brazil. In theory, and aligned the model suggested in Figure 8, the Brazilian institution can be both

a provider and a recipient of international cooperation, since its connection with the development agenda is via the SDGs.

FIGURE 8
Social network of the Brazilian IDC institutions (2021)



Source: Ipea (2022b).

Obs.: 1. Does not include the capital integralization to the NDB, in the amount of R\$ 3.452 billion in 2021.

2. Figure whose layout and texts could not be formatted due to the technical characteristics of the original files (Publisher's note).

6 FINAL REMARKS

This paper analyzed regularities and empirical trends in Brazil's insertion in the IDC agenda, particularly in its cooperation "for abroad". Drawing on data from the Cobradi research since 2010 and from the OECD, the paper discussed four long-lasting features of Brazilian cooperation since 2005: over-representation, ambivalence, decentralization and instrumentalism. Although the paper did not intend to raise conjectures or explanatory hypotheses for the regularities, it at least demonstrates the usefulness of relying on an empirical basis to explain the Brazilian behavior and its participation in the international development agenda.

Certainly, the development of new research questions about Brazil's international insertion in IDC is necessary and desirable. In the debate on over-representation, the real effects of Brazilian expenditures with international institutions need urgent investigation. Knowing that compulsory and voluntary

contributions represent a significant portion of Brazilian expenditures on IDC in the time series, it is fundamental to ask about the gains and impacts of such contributions in assuring the prominence of the Brazilian interests in the IDC agenda. Regarding ambivalence, and particularly to the case of Brazil's international cooperation in the areas of education and science, it is useful to think about internationalization in an integrated way and beyond.

As for decentralization, it is also necessary to raise more questions and conduct more studies, particularly to understand the impacts of both cooperation abroad and cooperation offered from abroad implemented by the federated entities. In the one hand, the cooperation for abroad implemented by the federal entities and their institutions has the potential to generate virtuous cross-border policy networks. On the other the cooperation received from developed countries needs to be discussed from a perspective of the coherence between their interests and the state and local public policy priorities, at the risk of interfering with the democratic processes that sustain the policy priorities in Brazil. Finally, it is urgent to think about ways of integrating the management of international cooperation and national public policies, so that it is possible to go beyond the instrumentalism arising from particular interests of national public policy areas. As-food-for-thought, specific legislation regulating the Brazilian South-South cooperation is urgently needed.

Even considering that this paper has a consistent empirical base, trends such as decentralization cannot be generalized, since they are limited by the findings of the 2021 Cobradi research. Therefore, the next few years will be key to assess the dynamics of Brazil's cooperation, given deep changes likely to be implemented by the new government in 2023, whose promise was of expanding the Brazilian participation in the IDC agenda. The creation of new ministries at the federal level – totaling thirty-seven – has the potential to further pulverize the channels of the Brazilian participation on IDC, a topic that deserves attention. It is still necessary to await the new division of competencies among federal institutions concerning the national and international development agendas.

In this sense, the regularities presented in this paper help in particular to open the “pandora's box” of contributions to international institutions, which needs to be treated with greater rigor of analysis. Overall, it is essential that the Brazilian IDC has a regular time-series and a year-to-year comparable statistic. The Brazilian IDC must be like any other national public policy: evidence-based and data-driven.

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